Mary White v. Supreme Ct of NJ by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-27-2009 
Mary White v. Supreme Ct of NJ 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Mary White v. Supreme Ct of NJ" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1653. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1653 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
BLD-103 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-3818
___________
MARY E. WHITE,
                       Appellant
v.
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY;
CHIEF JUSTICE STUART RABNER
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-02300)
District Judge:  Honorable Katharine S. Hayden
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 12, 2009
Before:  McKEE, FISHER and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 27, 2009)
__________
OPINION
__________
PER CURIAM
Mary White, proceeding pro se, appeals the orders of the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing her case and denying her motion for
reconsideration, respectively.  Because the appeal does not present a substantial question,
It appears that the District Court Clerk’s office rejected White’s original “notice1
of appeal” in April 2008.
It appears that one of the claims White raised in her petition was that she was2
entitled to attorney’s fees for pro se work she had completed in that case.  Her attempt in
the instant case to invoke the Equal Access to Justice Act as a means of obtaining
attorney’s fees in her state court case is misplaced, as the statute is clearly inapplicable
here.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
In White’s motion for reconsideration before the District Court, she requested that3
the court “grant my Application for Representation (sent with Certification).”  Later, in a
July 2008 filing, she stated that her motion for reconsideration included “a request to
reconsider denial of [r]epresentation.”  Finally, in her notice of appeal, she notes that she
has “made several attempts to get [r]epresentation in all court matters,” and that she is
“without [r]epresentation.”
2
we will summarily affirm the District Court’s orders.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6.
In May 2008, White initiated the instant action against the New Jersey Supreme
Court and its Chief Justice by filing an “amended notice of appeal”  in the District Court. 1
White sought review of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial of her petition for
certification in a child custody case.   In addition to her amended notice of appeal, White2
filed a document entitled “Certification for Representation Application.”  Although this
document essentially recounted a number of problems that allegedly had arisen in White’s
numerous New Jersey state court cases, her later filings suggest that she filed this
document either to contest her lack of counsel in those New Jersey state court cases or to
obtain court-appointed counsel in the instant case.3
3Later in May 2008, the District Court dismissed White’s claims sua sponte
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.  The court liberally construed White’s filings as either
seeking direct appellate review of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision or asserting
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The court concluded that (1) under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, the court lacked jurisdiction to exercise appellate review over the state court’s
decision; and (2) White’s § 1983 claims were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. 
In June 2008, White moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, which the District Court
denied in August 2008.  White now timely appeals the District Court’s May and August
2008 orders to this Court.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of White’s claims.  See Turner v.
Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006) (exercising
plenary review over district court’s invocation of Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (exercising plenary review over district
court’s dismissal of complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)).  To the extent
White sought appellate review of the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision, the District
Court correctly invoked the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and dismissed her claims for lack
of jurisdiction.  Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to review certain state court decisions.  Turner, 449 F.3d at 547.  The
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
Chief Justice Rabner denied White’s state court motion seeking reconsideration of4
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s denial of her petition for certification.
4
state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
inviting district court view and rejection of those judgments.”  Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).  Although Rooker-Feldman is a very
narrow doctrine, see Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, it nevertheless is implicated here, as
the instant claims (1) were raised after the New Jersey Supreme Court’s adverse ruling
and (2) sought to nullify that ruling.
The District Court also correctly concluded that White’s claims fail as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 claims.  In most circumstances, § 1983 bars injunctive relief claims against
judicial officers for acts or omissions made in their judicial capacity.  See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).  Given that the exceptions to
this provision do not apply here, White’s claims, to the extent they seek to attack the
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court for his ruling in her state court case,  are4
barred.  Furthermore, to the extent White’s “Certification for Representation Application”
can be construed as alleging a violation of her right to counsel in the state court
proceedings, this claim is without merit, as a civil litigant does not have a constitutional
right to counsel.  See Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456 (3d Cir. 1997).
5Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s dismissal of White’s
claims and the court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration.
